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I. INTRODUCTION
Feminist jurisprudence responds to men's societal domination,
domination cloaked in neutrality that has oppressed women.' This
oppression has left women capable of empathy for other women and
less powerful members of society. Men, too, through various exper-
iences, can acquire such empathy. Empathy appears in judicial deci-
sionmaking through attention to context, recognition of relationships,
and concern for community. This Comment refracts feminist juris-
prudence through the lens of Justice Rosemary Barkett of the Florida
Supreme Court.2
In Part II, this Comment discusses feminist legal theory and fem-
inist jurisprudence, and attempts to explain the various strains of fem-
inist theory. Then, it considers the relationship of women-like
Justice Rosemary Barkett-to feminist jurisprudence. Finally, it dis-
cusses the contributions of various scholars and suggests common
themes that have emerged in feminist jurisprudence.
Part III shows how feminist jurisprudence plays out in Justice
1. See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE
(1989); ZILLAH EISENSTEIN, FEMINISM AND SEXUAL EQUALITY 11 (1984). See generally
SIMONE DE BEAUVOIR, THE SECOND SEX (H.M. Parshley trans. 1953).
2. Justice Barkett was appointed to the Florida Supreme Court in 1985 and is the first
and only woman on the court. Michael Moline, Former Nun Named Supreme Court Justice,
UPI, Oct. 2, 1985. A former nun and former schoolteacher, Barkett is the daughter of Syrian
immigrants and grew up in Mexico. Id.
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Barkett's decisionmaking. It delves into her opinions, showing how
her decisional approach employs empathy, which heightens her
awareness of context. Justice Barkett staunchly denies practicing
feminist jurisprudence. 3 An analysis of her opinions, however, sug-
gests that she implements tenets of feminist jurisprudence.'
Part III.A shows how Justice Barkett applies feminist jurispru-
dence to tort law. Part III.B discusses the feminist aspects of Bar-
kett's decisionmaking in family law. Part III.C considers the
application of feminist's jurisprudence to the death penalty. It dis-
cusses how Justice Barkett's opinions illustrate her empathy for less
powerful members of society. Criminal defendants, especially those
on death row, are often subjects of her empathy. As Part III.C points
out, judges may empathize with different actors in the same setting.
Part III.C shows, however, that Justice Barkett does not always
empathize with defendants. In bar disciplinary proceedings, she is
tough on attorneys who undermine the legal system. Part III.D ana-
lyzes Justice Barkett's opinions on discrimination law. These cases,
perhaps more than the others, show her extreme sensitivity to less
powerful members of society-that is, those traditionally excluded
from the community.
Part IV attempts to reconcile feminist jurisprudence and Justice
Barkett's approach with traditional legal thought. It concludes that
feminist jurisprudence is a legitimate, alternative approach to judicial
decisionmaking. Other judges should follow Justice Barkett's
example.
This Comment describes only one approach to feminist jurispru-
3. Interview with Rosemary Barkett, Justice, Florida Supreme Court, in Miami, Fla.
(April 1991). Upon her appointment, Justice Barkett said that she was not sure if she qualified
as a feminist. Moline, supra note 2. However, one need not be a self-proclaimed "feminist" to
contribute to feminist jurisprudence. This Comment does not intend to praise or stigmatize
Justice Barkett as a feminist.
Most judges, Rosemary Barkett included, disavow adherence to any jurisprudential
theory. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE (1990). Posner,
referring to the Bork controversy, suggests that judges are wise to refrain from articulating any
particular jurisprudential theory. After all, a judge's job is to use the law to find the "right"
answer-not to implement ideology. This Comment suggests that feminist jurisprudence, as
reflected in Justice Barkett's opinions, is one alternative route to the "right" answer. Of
course, there is no single "right" answer to every problem, but an approach can be "right" in
the sense that it is moral and consistent with the judicial role. See Patricia A. Cain, Good and
Bad Bias: A Comment on Feminist Theory and Judging, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1945 (1988)
[hereinafter Cain, Good and Bad Bias].
4. This Comment discusses five areas of law in which Justice Barkett has written
opinions. These areas-tort law, family law, death penalty law, attorney disciplinary
proceedings, and discrimination law-were selected to facilitate discussion of feminist
jurisprudence. No major cases or areas of case law that would negate the thesis of this
Comment were overlooked.
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dence through Justice Barkett's opinions; it does not define feminist
jurisprudence in the abstract. Instead, its offering to feminist juris-
prudence is contextual.5 It demonstrates Justice Barkett's actual, con-
crete jurisprudence and its implications for feminist jurisprudence.
This Comment's methodology-a contextual showing of what one
judge actually has accomplished through judicial decisionmaking-is
part of this Comment's point. One of the major feminist criticisms of
traditional legal thought is its constant abstractions of principles,
principles without reference to real experiences.6 This Comment
would be open to the same critique if it attempted to define feminist
jurisprudence in the abstract. Though it associates certain character-
istics with feminist jurisprudence-empathy, in particular-it does
not intend to convey the message that all women, or even all femi-
nists, embrace similar values.7
II. FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE
A. Overview
Feminist jurisprudence has emerged over the last decade as a cri-
tique of mainstream (masculine) jurisprudence.' An overview of fem-
5. See Heather R. Wishik, To Question Everything: The Inquiries of Feminist
Jurisprudence, 1 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 64 (1985).
6. See, e.g., Ann C. Scales, The Emergence of Feminist Jurisprudence: An Essay, 95
YALE L.J. 1373, 1376-80 (1986). Scales discusses the "male" concept of abstract universality,
contending that it constructs a "dark tunnel to its tainted delusion." Id. at 1377. She writes:
It made maleness the norm of what is human, and did so sub rosa, all in the
name of neutrality. By this subterranean system, the "relevant" differences have
been and always will be those which keep women in their place. Abstract
universality is ideology, pure and simple. It is a conception of the world which
takes "the part for the whole, the particular for the universal and essential, or the
present for the eternal." With the allegedly anonymous picture of humanity
reflecting a picture males have painted of themselves, women are but male
subjectivity glorified, objectified, elevated to the status of reality. The values of
things "out there" are made to appear as if they were qualities of the things
themselves. So goes the process of objectification: the winner is he who makes
his world seem necessary.
Id. at 1378 (footnotes omitted).
7. See infra notes 29-32 and accompanying text.
8. See, e.g., MACKINNON, supra note 1, at 124. See generally Catharine A. MacKinnon,
Feminism, Marxism, Method and the State: Toward Feminist Jurisprudence, 8 SIGNS: J.
WOMEN CULTURE & Soc'Y 635 (1983); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Portia in a Different Voice:
Speculations on a Women's Lawyering Process, 1 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 39 (1985); Janet
Rifkin, Toward a Theory of Law and Patriarchy, 3 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 83 (1980); Scales,
supra note 6; Joan Williams, Deconstructing Gender, 87 MICH. L. REv. 797 (1989); Frances
Olsen, The Sex of Law (1984) (unpublished paper, presented to the Section on Women and the
Law, American Association of Law Schools Annual Meeting, Jan. 6, 1985).
Whether feminist jurisprudence has yet succeeded in its critique is a topic of debate. See,
e.g., Jeanne L. Schroeder, Abduction from the Seraglio: Feminist Methodologies and the Logic
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inist jurisprudence reveals that feminists fall into three broad
categories: cultural feminists, equality feminists, and radical femi-
nists. The categories provide a framework within which to analyze
Justice Barkett's opinions.
Cultural feminists-Carol Gilligan and her followers-suggest
that women and men reason differently because of their diverse devel-
opmental processes.' Gilligan is ambiguous as to whether this differ-
ence is biological (inevitable) or a social construct.'" Boys, she says,
create their identity by individuating from their mothers, while girls
experience themselves as connected with their mothers.t1 As a result,
women have a "different voice," a voice that is relational, connected,
caring, and empathetic. 12 Men, by contrast, become objective, indi-
vidualistic, and more capable of abstraction.' 3 Gilligan concludes
that women's "different voice" is not substandard, but another way of
relating in the world.' 4 Perhaps, she implies, a better way. I" Few
scholars now accept Gilligan's empirical work and conclusions
wholesale. 16
Equality feminists comprise a second group of feminists.'" This
group of feminists assert that women deserve the same rights that
men enjoy. They focus "on issues of equality-the right to equal
treatment and the right to reproductive choice,"' 8 for example. These
feminists supported the equal rights amendment and other more suc-
of Imagination, 70 TEX. L. REV. 109, 112 (1991) ("[M]uch feminist jurisprudential writing to
date might be seen as an attempt to escape one masculinist set of theories by throwing itself
into the arms of another masculinist jurisprudence."); Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender,
55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 4 (1988) (arguing that feminist jurisprudence is a conceptual anomaly so
long as legal doctrine does not take women's humanity seriously).
9. See CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE 7 (1982).
10. See id. at 7-23. This question, however, is a major one and pervades any discussion of
gender differences. Its resolution is beyond the scope of this Comment. For further discussion
of this issue, see NANCY CHODOROW, THE REPRODUCTION OF MOTHERING (1978).
11. See GILLIGAN, supra note 9, at 7-9 (explaining Chodorow's attempt to account for
personality differences between the sexes).
12. Id. at 160.
13. Id. at 161-63.
14. See id. at 171-74.
15. See id. at 171-74; see also Christine A. Littleton, Feminist Jurisprudence: The
Difference Method Makes, 41 STAN. L. REV. 751 (1989).
16. See, e.g., Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARv. L. REV. 829, 871
n. 174 (listing critics of Gilligan who argue that Gilligan's material does not support her thesis
and that she exaggerates the male-female duality).
17. See, e.g., Wendy 0. Williams, Equality's Riddle: Pregnancy and the Equal Treatment!
Special Treatment Debate, 13 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 325 (1985).
18. Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Dialectic of Rights and Politics: Perspectives from the
Women's Movement, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 589, 624 (1986).
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cessful legislation. 9 Their search for "equal rights" has succeeded in
some areas, but failed in others. 20 The equality feminists' quest for
rights contradicts cultural feminists' belief that women, for the most
part, are not rights-oriented.21
A third category of feminists-the radicals-"describe the
essence of women as invasion and torment. Radical feminism views
women's connection to others-precisely that which is celebrated by
cultural feminists-as 'the source of women's debasement, powerless,
subjugation, and misery.' "22 Robin West describes radical feminism:
The deepest unofficial story of radical feminism may be that inti-
macy-the official value of cultural feminism-is itself oppressive.
Women secretly, unofficially, and surreptitiously long for the very
individuation that cultural feminism insists women fear: the free-
dom, the independence, the individuality, the sense of wholeness,
the confidence, the self-esteem, and the security of identity which
can only come from a life, a history, a path, a voice, a sexuality, a
womb, and a body of one's own. 23
Catherine MacKinnon, a radical feminist scholar, criticizes "femi-
nine" stereotypes as socially imposed, confining characteristics cre-
ated by patriarchy to keep women powerless.24
B. Common Themes
All three accounts of feminism may be valid. In fact, an overrid-
ing theme of feminist jurisprudence is its diversity. Justice Barkett's
feminist jurisprudence does not adhere strictly to any of the three
accounts of feminist thought, but draws upon all three. She has a
great capacity for empathy, perhaps for the reasons cultural feminists
give. Or, as this Comment suggests, Barkett's unique experiences-to
an extent a product of her gender-have allowed her to develop
empathy for powerless individuals. Women, diverse as they are, have
19. See, e.g., Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C. S. 2000e(k) (1982).
Equality feminists would also give women equal status to men in the military.
20. Almost every equal protection case decided by the Supreme Court in the name of
women's equality has come down in favor of a man. For instance, an alimony statute
requiring only men to pay alimony was held unconstitutional in Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268
(1979), and a man was allowed to attend an all female nursing school, Mississippi University for
Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982). For a discussion of where equality feminism has failed,
see MacKinnon, supra note 8, at 635; Christine A. Littleton, Book Review, Feminist
Jurisprudence: The Difference Method Makes, 41 STAN. L. REV. 751, 757 (critiquing
MacKinnon's criticism of equality feminism). See also Schneider, supra note 18, at 630-33.
21. See GILLIGAN, supra note 9.
22. Dennis Patterson, Postmodernism/Feminism/Law, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 254, 282
(1992) (citing West, supra note 8).
23. West, supra note 8, at 35.
24. See MACKINNON, supra note 1.
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one commonality. As radical feminists insist, equality feminists agree,
and cultural feminists would admit, all women have been oppressed,
either personally and knowingly, or on a society-wide basis, often so
insidiously that it escapes notice. 25 From this common experience of
powerlessness, women emerge with an ability to empathize with other
less powerful members of society.26
Finally, Barkett draws upon equality feminism for the proposi-
tion that the law should treat women equally to men, except in
instances where women need extra protection. Barkett does not dis-
cuss whether women sometimes need extra protection because of biol-
ogy, culture, or past oppression.
C. Misconceptions About Feminist Jurisprudence
As Professor Bartlett recognizes, the term "feminist jurispru-
dence" is problematic.27 Many assume, for instance, that "woman" is
the analytic basis for feminist jurisprudence. This assumption implies
that all women are the same, which they are not.28 Women do not
25. Deborah Rhode describes some of the oppression women have faced:
Long after women gained formal admission to the bar, many educators,
employers, and bar associations continued to resist the 'clack of ... possible
Portias.' The stated concerns were manifold, ranging from the risks of
unchaperoned intellectual intercourse in libraries to the seemingly
insurmountable difficulties of constructing separate lavatory facilities. At least
some of the resistance, however, rested on women's presumed intellectual
incapacity and emotional instability.... Leading law schools, law firms, and law
associations excluded women entirely or relegated them to subordinate roles.
Deborah L. Rhode, The Women's Point of View, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 39, 40 (1988).
26. Less powerful members of society include, for example, African Americans, the poor,
the elderly, the uneducated, or the handicapped. This is not to say that men are not capable of
empathy. For a complete discussion of empathy, see Lynne N. Henderson, Legality and
Empathy, 85 MicH. L. REV. 1574, 1578-87 (1987).
27. See Bartlett, supra note 16, at 833-36 (discussing problems with the label "feminist").
28. See id. at 834 (arguing that "use of the label 'feminist' has contributed to a tendency
within feminism to assume a definition of 'woman' or a standard for 'women's experiences'
that is fixed, exclusionary, homogenizing, and oppositional, a tendency that feminists have
criticized in others"). Accord Elizabeth Spelman, INESSENTIAL WOMAN (1990).
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have a unitary viewpoint. 29 Not only gender, °3 but experience, educa-
tion, race, class, sexual preference, age, religion, and political beliefs
(among other factors) construct a woman's-or a man's-perspec-
tive.3 1 Using the term "woman" as an analytic base for feminist juris-
prudence also excludes men from feminist jurisprudence. a2 Yet men
can, and do, practice feminist jurisprudence.33
If women are not the basis for feminist jurisprudence, who or
what is? After all, feminist jurisprudence, as its name suggests, grew
out of feminism, a political struggle by women, for women.34 Its cen-
tral concern was women. This Comment contends that feminist juris-
prudence, as it evolves, will no longer have women as its primary
concern. Feminist jurisprudence may tend initially to favor women,
29. See Rhode, supra note 25, at 41 ("To assume that feminism offers one theoretical
stance is to miss a central point of recent feminist theory.... [C]ontemporary feminists stress
the inability of any single overarching framework, including a feminist one, to provide an
adequate account of social experience."); see, e.g., PAULA GIDDINGS, WHEN AND WHERE I
ENTER: THE IMPACT OF BLACK WOMEN ON RACE AND SEX IN AMERICA (1984); Patricia A.
Cain, Feminist Jurisprudence: Grounding the Theories, 4 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 191 (1989-
90); Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist
Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 139 (1989); Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42
STAN. L. REV. 581 (1990); Littleton, supra note 15. Cf Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Racial Critiques
of Legal Academia: A Reply in Favor of Context, 43 STAN. L. REV. 137 (1990).
30. Gender identity is a complex, socially determined phenomenon. "One is not born, but
rather becomes, a woman." SIMONE DE BEAUVOIR, supra note 1, at 267 (H. Parshley trans.
1968). "Feminine" and "masculine" points of view (if they exist) vary among individuals,
although they may be "demonstrably sex-linked [to] the rites of genderization." Scales, supra
note 6, at 1373 n.2. This Comment does not suggest that all women subscribe to "feminine"
points of view. Both sexes have diverse points of view.
31. See GILLIGAN, supra note 9. Some feminists claim that women's experiences are a
necessary prerequisite to being feminist. Bartlett, supra note 16, at 833 n.7 (citing Christine A.
Littleton, Reconstructing Sexual Equality, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1279, 1294 n.91 (1987)). Others
define feminism to include men as well as women. Id. (quoting Linda Gordon, What's New in
Women's History, in FEMINIST STUDIES/CRITICAL STUDIES 20, 30 (T. de Lauretis ed. 1986)).
32. This Comment, despite its demonstration of the contribution of a "woman" to feminist
jurisprudence, maintains that men must be included in feminist jurisprudence. One need not
be a woman to share a woman's perspective. Concededly, it may be easier for women to access
a woman's perspective, but it is not impossible for a man to be a feminist or hold feminist
views. For an analogy in the context of race, see generally Johnson, supra note 29.
33. See, e.g., William J. Brennan, Reason, Passion, and "The Progress of the Law;" The
Forty-Second Annual Benjamin N. Cardozo Lecture, 10 Card. L. Rev. 3 (1988) (suggesting that
"sensitivity to one's intuitive and passionate responses, and awareness of the range of human
experience, is an inevitable but desirable part of the judicial process..."); Eric T. Freyfogle,
Context and Accommodation in Modern Property Law, 41 Stan. L. Rev. 1529, 1547 (1989)
(arguing for context-dependent allocation of water use entitlements and suggesting that a more
humane jurisprudence incorporates and "insist[s] on the particular"); JOHN R. NOONAN, JR.,
PERSONS AND MASKS OF THE LAW (1976) (asserting that judges emphasize rules too much
and people too little).
34. Feminism began as a political struggle to empower women by ending male domination
of societal institutions.
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but only to the extent that laws have excluded them and left them
powerless in the past. Its aim, however, is not for jurisprudential the-
ory by women, for women, but for a jurisprudence that allows under-
standing of experiences, relationships, and relative power of
individuals.
Another obstacle to feminist jurisprudence is the widely received
negative implication of "feminist." To many, a feminist is a radical, a
man-hating militant. There are women afraid to join women's organi-
zations for fear of being dubbed a feminist or a lesbian. 3" This Com-
ment urges readers to disregard these unfortunate, outdated
misconceptions about feminism.3 6
A third problem with feminist jurisprudence is that many con-
sider it a subversive jurisprudential approach.37 Like the critical legal
studies movement, feminist jurisprudence frightens formalists who
guard and honor the traditional Rule of Law. 38  Feminist jurispru-
dence, this Comment explains, does not subvert the Rule of Law; it
merely suggests alternative applications of the Rule of Law where the
Rule of Law discounts the experiences of certain individuals.39
III. JUSTICE BARKETT'S FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE
A. Tort Law
Kendrick v. Ed's Beach Service, Inc.' is an example of Justice
Barkett's ability to empathize with a man in an unfortunate situation.
35. Cf Patricia A. Cain, Feminist Jurisprudence: Grounding the Theories, 4 BERKELEY
WOMEN'S L.J. 191 (lesbian critique of feminism).
36. Leslie Bender discusses the hostility toward and misconceptions about feminism:
Feminists are portrayed as bra-burners, man-haters, sexists, and castrators. Our
sexual preferences are presumed. We are characterized as bitchy, demanding,
aggressive, confrontational, and uncooperative, as well as overly sensitive and
humorless. No wonder many women, particularly career women, struggle to
distance themselves from the opprobrium appended to the label .... And for
every woman that cowers from the word, even more men recoil and raise
defenses that cloud their vision and deafen their ears. Although these negative
responses make it extremely difficult to understand what feminism is and what
promise it holds for all of us, let us try to look with an open curiosity at feminist
projects.
Leslie Bender, A Lawyer's Primer on Feminist Theory and Tort, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 3, 3
(1988).
37. People had similar fears about legal realism and critical legal theory. See Gary Minda,
The Jurisprudential Movements of the 1980s, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 599, 632 (1990).
38. See, e.g., Owen M. Fiss, The Death of the Law?, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1986)
(contending that new jurisprudential approaches threaten the Rule of Law). But see Frederick
Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509 (1988) (arguing that formalism has an undeserved bad
reputation).
39. For a reconciliation of feminist jurisprudence and the Rule of Law, see infra Part IV.
40. 577 So. 2d 936 (Fla. 1991).
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Raymond Kendrick dove from a lifeguard stand into a pool three-
and-a-half feet deep and badly hurt himself. Barkett's opinion sug-
gests that she empathized with his experience. She wrote:
Evidence . . . showed that Raymond Kendrick . . . believed the
water was at least six feet deep. No lifeguard occupied the life-
guard chair when the accident occurred, and there was some testi-
mony that Kendrick would not have sustained the injury had a
lifeguard been present in the chair. Other evidence was presented
to show that no warning signs were visible, and had warning signs
been posted, Kendrick may not have made the dive.4"
This passage shows Barkett's concern for Raymond Kendrick's
situation. She recognized his belief-that the water was deep enough
for diving-and legitimized that belief, pointing out the absence of a
lifeguard and warning signs. Barkett went further to find that even
had Kendrick known of the danger and acted unreasonably, the doc-
trine of assumption of risk would not bar his recovery.42 That is, she
refused to apply a harsh, abstract rule-assumption of risk-that
would ignore Kendrick's actual situation.43
Leslie Bender argues in her article on Feminist Theory and Tort"
that tort law should lessen its reliance on "universal" rules of negli-
gence.45 In Kendrick, Barkett applied Bender's theory by rejecting a
rigid tort rule. Professor Bender also theorizes that tort law should
take account of relationships, care, and responsibility.46 Casby v.
Flint47 illustrates Barkett's own concern for the care required in the
relationship between a host and his social guests. The majority in
Casby decided as a matter of law that a host's duty of reasonable care
does not extend to warning a social guest about multiple floor levels in
a dimly lit or overcrowded room because such a condition is obvious
and not inherently dangerous. The plaintiff had fallen because of a
41. Id. at 938.
42. Id.
43. According to Barkett, Kendrick could recover damages "under the principles of
comparative negligence if the elements of the tort [had] been proven." Id. A concurring
opinion did not reject the doctrine of express assumption of risk. Id. at 939 (McDonald, J.,
specially concurring).
44. See Bender, supra note 36.
45. See id. at 20-25. Mainstream legal doctrine teaches that negligence represents a breach
of the duty of care. In order to determine whether a duty of care has been breached, the
actor's conduct is measured against what a "reasonable man" would do under same or similar
circumstances. Bender argues that even the recent shift to "reasonable person" implicitly
measures against the male norm. Id.
46. According to Bender, judges could convert the present standard of "care of a
reasonable person under same or similar circumstances" into a standard of "conscious care
and concern of a responsible neighbor or social acquaintance for another under same or similar
circumstances." Id. at 31.
47. 520 So. 2d 281 (Fla. 1988).
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difference in floor levels, allegedly obscured by other guests. Barkett,
in her special concurrence, would have submitted the issue to the
jury.4" The jury could weigh the facts of the situation and make a
decision on their perception of what happened and whom should be
responsible. For instance, the jury might have recognized the relative
knowledge of the actors involved. The host knew of the precarious
condition in her home. This knowledge placed the host in a position
of power over the social guest. Barkett probably would empathize
with the less powerful actor, and require responsibility from the more
powerful actor.49
Home v. Vic Potamkin Chevrolet, Inc." provides another exam-
ple of Barkett's keen awareness of actual relationships between une-
qual parties. In Home, an auto dealer allowed an elderly woman to
drive away in a new car despite the salesperson's knowledge that she
was an incompetent driver.5 The salesperson had witnessed two near
accidents by the woman while she test drove the car.5 2 At one point,
the salesperson had to grab the steering wheel to avoid a colliding
with a bus.53 He predicted (accurately, as it turned out) that the eld-
erly woman "would not drive one block without causing an
48. Id. at 283 (Barkett, J., specially concurring).
49. Along the same line, in Bankston v. Brennan, 507 So. 2d 1385 (Fla. 1987), the majority
refused to hold a social host liable for serving alcohol to a minor invited to the host's party.
The majority held that, because the applicable state statute was intended to limit a vendor's
liability in this situation, it would be illogical to assume that the statute created a new cause of
action against a social host. Id. at 1387. Barkett wrote specially to state that she would place
more liability on social hosts in this situation because of the special relationship created
between a social host and minors served alcohol. Id. at 1387-88 (Barkett, J., specially
concurring). Although she agreed with the majority that the statute was not intended to create
a cause of action against a social host, Barkett stated that if she were writing "on a clean
slate," she would create a cause of action against a social host for furnishing alcohol to minors.
Id. Barkett empathized with the minor, who stands in a position of powerlessness relative to
the social host.
In Kaisner v. Kolb, 543 So. 2d 732 (Fla. 1989), Barkett found a duty of care where the
dissent did not. Writing for the majority, she concluded that a police officer who ordered a
motorist to stop and pull off the road established a custodial relationship with the motorist,
creating a duty of care to minimize traffic hazards. Id. at 734. She reasoned that the motorist
was not free to leave or to protect himself from onrushing traffic. The motorist's only
alternative would have been to disobey the officer's instructions and thus subject himself to
immediate arrest and criminal charges. Id. Barkett showed feminist empathy for the motorist,
powerless in the custody of a police officer. The dissent "fail[ed] to see where a duty existed to
the plaintiffs from the [police officers] requiring the [officers] to protect the plaintiff from the
negligent act of the driver of the car which collided with the police car." Id. at 739
(McDonald, J., dissenting).
50. 533 So. 2d 261 (Fla. 1988).
51. Id. at 261.
52. Id. at 263 (Kogan, J., dissenting).
53. Id.
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accident."5 4
While leaving the dealership, the woman caused an accident that
seriously injured her passenger. The passenger sued the dealership on
a negligent entrustment theory, and a majority of the court found the
dealership not liable. Despite the obvious facts, the majority asserted
that the dealership's knowledge of the buyer's incompetence-an ele-
ment of negligent entrustment-was impossible to determine. Fur-
thermore, the court found that the applicable Florida Statute
expressly exempted car dealers from buyers' post-sale negligence in
operating the car."
Barkett joined the dissent, which posited a technical argument
about the statute's application,56 and chastised the court for forgetting
that knowledge is a question for the jury, not the court. A feminist
analysis of Horne-not explicit in the dissent-would empathize with
the elderly woman buyer (and her injured passenger), both of whom
lacked power in this situation. The power imbalance between the eld-
erly woman and the relatively young male car salesman is blatant.
Yet the majority ignored this discrepancy. Although the passenger
suffered nearly $200,000 in damages, she was left without recourse.57
Celotex Corp. v. Meehan," which involved personal injury
actions arising from asbestos exposure again illustrates Barkett's femi-
nist approach to tort law. One of the plaintiffs, Mr. Meehan, had
been exposed to asbestos while working as a pipefitter at a Brooklyn
navy shipyard during World War II. 9 In 1969, Meehan and his wife
moved to Florida.60 Eight years after their move, doctors diagnosed
Meehan with asbestosis and mesothelioma.61 Under New York law,
Mr. Meehan's cause of action arose upon termination of his employ-
ment at the shipyard.62 However, as Barkett pointed out in her dis-
sent, Mr. Meehan could not have known of his injury at that time
because asbestos-related diseases develop very slowly. 63 Ignoring that
fact, the majority concluded that the plaintiffs could not maintain
54. Id.
55. Id. at 262.
56. The majority prized the certainty of a universal rule: no car dealers shall be liable for
buyers' car accidents. Id. at 262. The dissent criticized the majority's reliance on the statute
exempting car dealers from buyers' post-sale negligence. The buyer's passenger sued the car
dealer for the dealer's negligent sale of the car, whereas the statute only exempted car dealers
from liability created by buyers' post-sale negligence. Id. at 264 (Kogan, J., dissenting).
57. Id. at 263.
58. 523 So. 2d 141 (Fla. 1988).
59. Id. at 144.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 145.
63. Id. at 149-50 (Barkett, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
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their personal injury actions under Florida's "discovery rule" because
the statute of limitations had run in the state where the "injury"
occurred. 64
Barkett applied the statute of limitations of the state where the
injury occurred but reconceptualized "injury" to maximize protection
under the statute of limitations rule. Barkett's dissent reframed the
issue, focusing on the state that had "the most significant relationship
to the cause of action and the parties. ' 65 Barkett first recognized the
"unique features" 66 of asbestos-related diseases. In most personal
injury cases, the plaintiff's injury is obvious. But because asbestos
injuries do not develop until some twenty years after exposure, the
time and place of injury is obscure.67 Therefore, a court must decide
whether the injury occurred at the time of asbestos exposure or later
in the disease's progression.68 Not everyone exposed to asbestos
becomes ill; consequently not everyone exposed to asbestos is
injured.69
Barkett reasoned that the state where the alleged wrongful con-
duct occurred-the place of exposure to the asbestos-may not be the
state with the "most significant relationship" to the cause of action.7 °
Barkett argued that the court should evaluate all aspects of the
"injury" to determine which state has the most "significant relation-
ship" to the claim.7'
Barkett also advocated considering the state's interest in adjudi-
cating the claim, availability of witnesses, and hardship to the defend-
ant.72 Florida had an interest in protecting its residents from the
hazards of asbestosis and providing them with a cause of action, lim-
ited only by their discovery of the disease.73 Because the disease
developed in Florida, all the witnesses and testimony on damages
were in Florida.74 Furthermore, because Celotex Corporation was a
Florida corporation, it would have suffered no hardship if it had to
litigate the plaintiffs' claim in Florida.7 5 Finally, and perhaps most
64. Id. at 143-45.
65. Id. at 148 (Barkett, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
66. Id. at 149.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Barkett noted that the progression of the disease is unpredictable. Id. at 149-50.
70. Id. at 151.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Barkett stated that, "thus, on the damages issue, the relationship between the parties
clearly is centered in Florida." Id.
75. Id.
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significant for feminist jurisprudence, the power structure in Celotex
required empathy for the plaintiffs. Celotex was a large, powerful cor-
poration; the plaintiffs were powerless in comparison.
B. Family Law
Writing for the majority in In Re Browning,76 Barkett allowed a
surrogate decisionmaker to refuse artificial life sustenance for an
incompetent. 77 At age eighty-six, Estelle Browning suffered a stroke
that left her without the function of the left region of her brain. 78 The
hospital transferred her to a nursing home, where she stayed for two
years, bedridden and in need of total care.79 The court appointed her
cousin and only living relative, Doris Herbert, as guardian." Bar-
kett's holding-allowing one person to make a decision about the life
of another-shows her empathy for and understanding of relation-
ships between people.81 Doris Herbert had lived with Estelle Brown-
ing for four years.8 2 During this time, the two women had discussed
Mrs. Browning's desire not to be kept alive artificially. 3
Justice Barkett refused to require a "cumbersome legal proceed-
ing" to implement the surrogate's decision, explaining that the deci-
sion to terminate artificial life sustenance is made "painfully by loving
family members, concerned guardians, or surrogates, in conjunction
with the advice of ethical and caring physicians .... "84 Her decision
not to impose a legal proceeding on the family suggests her concern
76. In re Guardianship of Browning v. Herbert, 568 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1990).
77. For a compelling and thorough discussion of the family and right to die issues, see
T.A. Tucker Ronzetti, Comment, Constituting Family and Death Through the Struggle with
State Power, 46 U. MIAMI L. REV. 149 (1991).
78. In re Browning, 568 So. 2d at 8.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Barkett may be capable of empathy in this situation because she has experienced close
relationships in her own life. Barkett is a daughter, a wife, a grandmother, and a friend to
many. The author of this Comment saw Justice Barkett at a social gathering holding one of
her grandchildren.
Cf Mary I. Coombs, Shared Privacy and the Fourth Amendment, Or the Rights of
Relationships, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1593 (1987) (arguing that Fourth Amendment law should be
reconceptualized to take account of people's shared lives).
82. In re Browning, 568 So. 2d at 8.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 14. Barkett refused "to impose a cumbersome legal proceeding at such a delicate
time in those many cases where the patient neither needs or desires additional protection." Id.
Barkett also considered the relationship of the state to preservation of life, protection of
innocent third parties, prevention of suicide, and maintenance of the ethical integrity of the
medical profession. She stated that these state interests were "by no means a bright-line test,
capable of resolving every dispute regarding the refusal of medical treatment." Id. After
considering each state interest contextually, Barkett concluded that these interests did not
outweigh the incompetent's rights. Id.
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for the relative lack of power of the family against the legal system, a
maze of heartless bureaucrats with little knowledge-much less empa-
thy-for the family's actual situation. 5
In another case, Department of Health v. Wright,8 6 the court used
a jurisdictional rule to deny recourse to a mother and child in an
action against the child's father. Barkett joined the dissent in finding
the mother's allegation of paternity and the father's failure to provide
child support sufficient to invoke long-arm jurisdiction to enforce a
child-support obligation."7 The dissent explained: "[A] legal system
must necessarily be dynamic in order to survive. Reliance on static,
inflexible principles based solely on tradition reflects an inability to
adapt to needs of present and future legal or moral problems. '88
The facts in Wright were compelling. The father had vanished to
Idaho, leaving the mother pregnant in Florida.89 The mother and
child had neither power nor resources. While the dissent empathized
with their situation, the majority refused to go beyond a rigid jurisdic-
tional analysis. Wright is a good example of feminist jurisprudence-
in an opinion that Justice Barkett did not even write.
Later, writing for the majority in Shriners Hospitals for Crippled
Children v. Zrillic,90 Justice Barkett struck down a statute nullifying
charitable devises made by a testator less than six months before
death. 91 In her last will and testament, Lorraine Romans bequeathed
most of her estate to a hospital for crippled children, leaving only the
antique dishes to her daughter. 92 The object of the statute was to
85. The dissent would have required a judicial proceeding. Id. at 17 (Overton, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). Cf In re T.W., 551 So. 2d 1186 (Fla. 1989), a case
involving parental consent to abortion that demonstrates the court's concern for relationships.
Although Barkett did not write an opinion in In re T W., she agreed with the majority opinion
that a statute requiring parental consent for a minor's abortion was unconstitutional. The
opinion recognized the relationship of minors to the legal system and to their families. The
court reasoned that minors are "unable to understand how to navigate the complicated court
system on their own or... are too intimidated by the seeming complexity to try." Id. at 1196.
The court also noted the minor's statement that it "would kill" her mother to find out about
the pregnancy. Id. at 1189.
The parental consent to abortion issue has generated considerable feminist scholarship.
See, e.g., Bartlett, supra note 16, at 852.
86. 522 So. 2d 838 (Fla. 1988). The court refused to find the father subject to Florida's
long-arm jurisdiction under the "tortious conduct" section of the long-arm statute. The court
stated that the father could not have committed a tort because he had no duty to the mother
and child without a full paternity adjudication. Id. at 840.
87. Id. at 841 (Kogan, J., dissenting).
88. Id. at 842.
89. Id. at 839.
90. 563 So. 2d 64 (Fla. 1990).
91. Id.
92. Id. at 65.
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protect a testator's family from "imprudent" devises to charity. 93 In
holding the statute to be an unconstitutional restriction on an owner's
right to dispose of property,94 Barkett displayed empathy for (and
respect for the dignity of) an older person who wanted to give to
charity. 9"
Barkett could just as easily, it seems, have directed empathy at
the testator's daughter, who stood to lose an inheritance. However,
she did not forget about the testator's family; in fact, her analysis
uncovered laws to protect surviving family members dependent on the
testator.
96
C. Death Penalty Law
Justice Barkett also practices feminist jurisprudence in death
penalty cases. Her opinions urge personalized decisionmaking, which
allows her-or the jury-to empathize with each capital defendant. 97
Admittedly, a judge could use empathy in a death penalty case and
93. Id. at 69.
94. Id.
95. Zrillic also might be read as facilitating a testator's relationship to her community.
Giving to a charity may be an elderly person's only means of including herself in the
community. Cf discrimination cases infra Part III.E.
96. "Although it may be reasonable... to protect [dependent] family members ... , it is
unreasonable to assume . . . that all lineal descendants are dependents, in need, or are not
otherwise provided for. Florida law is replete with protections for surviving family members
who may have been dependent on the testator." Zrillic, 563 So.2d at 69.
Barkett concurred specially in another family law case, Doe v. Roe, 543 So. 2d 741 (Fla.
1989). In that case a father did not provide pre-natal support and then sought to invalidate the
adoption of his child on the grounds that he had not consented to it. Justice Barkett had little
empathy for this father, and agreed with the majority that a father had no right to consent to
adoption of his child when he did not support the mother during her pregnancy. Id. at 749.
Barkett added in her special concurrence that the Doe holding would require modification if it
involved the mother's consent to adoption. Id. (Barkett, J., specially concurring).
97. Professor Resnik asks:
How can we be sure that connection and care are qualities we want for ourjudges? How... could an empathetic judge sentence another-in-whom-one-sees-
oneself to years of incarceration? . . . . For those of us who might applaud a
possible reduction in criminal penalties which such intimacy and empathy might
foster, we must recognize that our empathetic judges would not simply
experience connection with defendants, but also with victims. Might such judges
respond with too harsh condemnations? Or with paralysis from being torn in
many directions?
I think paralysis-by-connection to be no more likely than paralysis-by-
intellectualization. In our current world, in which we do not ask judges to
recognize their connectedness to those before them, some judges impose harsh
sentences and some more lenient ones; some judges impose obligations upon
litigants without much apparent stress while others appear reluctant to sanction.
Judith Resnik, On the Bias: Feminist Reconsiderations of the Aspirations for Our Judges, 61 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1877, 1924 (1988).
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reach results different from Justice Barkett. This too, would be a
legitimate exercise of feminist jurisprudence.
Barkett imposes the death penalty only after thorough considera-
tion of a defendant's situation. She carefully examines all mitigating
factors, and the effectiveness of counsel, and she advocates evidentiary
hearings, written findings, and special verdicts. She holds special
empathy for young and mentally ill defendants in death penalty cases.
Barkett dissented in Smith v. State98 and Adams v. State,99 con-
cluding that the judges' failure to instruct the jury to consider all non-
statutory mitigating factors required reversal of death sentences.
Barkett joined the majority's holding in Heiney v. Dugger"0 that a
judge's departure from the jury's recommendation of a life sentence
based on the belief that he could not consider nonstatutory mitigating
factors required reversal. In her concurrence, she pointed to facts
that could have formed the basis of the jury's recommendation. The
record, for instance, showed evidence of extreme alcohol and sub-
stance abuse. 101
Barkett frequently dissents on the basis of ineffective assistance of
counsel.I02 A lawyer who represents a defendant effectively will bring
to the court's or the jury's attention all facets of the defendant's life
and experiences. Without this information, decisionmaking would
rely on an objective abstraction of persons like the defendant. 13 Such
abstract decisionmaking would not allow for empathy. At the very
least, Barkett believes, the court should allow an evidentiary hearing
to determine a defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel."°
Barkett frequently would require evidentiary hearings when the
remainder of the court would not, on the basis that evidentiary hear-
ings promote full consideration of facts. For instance, she dissented
98. 556 So. 2d 1097 (Fla. 1990) (Barkett, J., dissenting)
99. 543 So. 2d 1244 (Fla. 1989) (Barkett, J., dissenting).
100. 558 So. 2d 398 (Fla. 1990).
101. Id. at 401 (Barkett, J., specially concurring).
102. See, e.g., White v. State, 559 So. 2d 1097, 1100 (Fla. 1990) (Barkett, J., dissenting);
Eutzy v. State, 536 So. 2d 1014, 1017 (Fla. 1988) (Barkett, J., dissenting). See also Atkins v.
Dugger, 541 So. 2d 1165, 1167 (Fla. 1989) (Barkett, J., specially concurring) (stating that
effective assistance of counsel requires counsel to have knowledge of all mitigating factors);
O'Callaghan v. State, 542 So. 2d 1324, 1327 (Fla. 1989) (Barkett, J., specially concurring)
(stating that she would grant an evidentiary hearing on the defendant's claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel); Francis v. Florida, 529 So. 2d 670 (Fla. 1988) (Barkett, J., dissenting)
(finding that counsel made virtually no effort to obtain mitigating evidence on behalf of his
client).
103. See Kenneth L. Karst, Judging and Belonging, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1957, 1958 (1988).
104. See, e.g., Heiney v. Dugger, 558 So. 2d 398, 400 (Fla. 1990); O'Callaghan, 542 So. 2d
at 1327.
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in Buenoano v. State,0 5 chiding the majority for not allowing a hear-
ing to determine the factual question of whether a defective electric
chair had been properly fixed before the state proceeded with the
defendant's execution. 106
Barkett also advocates written findings and special verdicts to
expose decisional facts, thereby preventing non-fact specific deci-
sions. 107 She wrote specially in Stewart v. State 108 to add that the trial
court should have provided specific written findings of fact showing
the aggravating and mitigating circumstances that supported imposi-
tion of the death penalty.0 9 She concurred specially in Haliburton v.
State,"0 asserting that she would require a special verdict delineating
the basis of conviction in all death penalty cases.1 1
Barkett's dissent in Hamblen v. Dugger"1 2 illustrates her compas-
sion for young and mentally impaired defendants in death penalty
cases. She contends that youth and mental disturbance are always
mitigating factors. In Hamblen, she found the "complete failure to
consider [the defendant's] mental disturbance, as well as the failure to
consider any other mitigating factors," to rendering the sentence
unreliable.' 13 Barkett chastised counsel in Woods v. State '" for fail-
ing to discover and present the defendant's documented history of
almost lifelong psychosis, which dated back to age eight. 1 15  In
Woods, Barkett also found that the defendant's age at the time the
crime was committed--eighteen-and his mental retardation consti-
105. 565 So. 2d 309, 312 (Fla. 1990).
106. Id. at 312-13 (Barkett, J., dissenting). Barkett's dissent adopted the compassionate
view that the death penalty would be cruel and unusual punishment in light of a
malfunctioning electric chair. Id. See also Johnson v. Feder, 485 So. 2d 409 (Fla. 1986).
Barkett wrote the court's opinion in Feder requiring that evidentiary hearings be held upon the
defendant's request in involuntary hospitalization cases.
107. Written findings of fact also allow reviewing courts to understand how the court or
jury analyzed the facts, thus focusing on the responsibility of the factfinder.
108. 558 So. 2d 416 (Fla. 1990).
109. Id. at 421 (Barkett, J., specially concurring). FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(3) (West
1985), provides that specific written findings of fact must support all death penalty
determinations. A case interpreting the statute to require reversal of the death sentence
without written findings of fact postdated the sentencing hearing in this case. See Stewart v.
State, 549 So. 2d 171 (Fla. 1989). Notwithstanding the lack of this interpretation at the time
this case arose, Justice Barkett recommended applying the writing mandate. Stewart, 558 So.
2d at 421 (Barkett, J., specially concurring).
110. 561 So. 2d 248 (Fla. 1990).
111. Id. at 252 (Barkett, J., specially concurring). Barkett would have required the special
verdict to state whether a first-degree murder conviction was based on felony murder or
premeditated murder. Id.
112. 546 So. 2d 1039 (Fla. 1989).
113. Id. at 1042 (Barkett, J., dissenting).
114. 531 So. 2d 79 (Fla. 1988).
115. Id. at 84 (Barkett, J., dissenting).
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tuted significant mitigating factors.1 1 6 In Le Croy v. State,'1 7 Barkett
explained: "I believe the death penalty is totally inappropriate when
applied to persons who, because of their youth, have not fully devel-
oped the ability to judge or consider the consequences of their behav-
ior."' ' She added that "there is some age below which a juvenile's
crimes can never be constitutionally punished by death."' 9
D. Attorney Disciplinary Proceedings
Although Barkett has great empathy for capital defendants, as
the death penalty cases show, she is considerably less sympathetic
toward more powerful groups like attorneys. Consequently, Barkett
is strict in bar disciplinary actions. Her empathy favors the commu-
nity, which is the ultimate victim of undisciplined lawyers.
In Florida Bar v. Wishart, 20 the majority held that a three-year
suspension rather than disbarment was the appropriate sanction for
an attorney who defied court orders in custody proceedings involving
his step-granddaughter.' 2' Justice Barkett, arguing for disbarment in
dissent, wrote that she could "think of no more flagrant misconduct
by an attorney than deliberately disobeying a series of direct orders by
the court."'' 22 She expressed concern that lawyers like Wishart cause
our legal system to fall into shambles. 23
Barkett, dissenting in Florida Bar v. Golden, 24 again preferred
disbarment to suspension for an attorney who committed insurance
fraud by deleting a line from a doctor's report to obtain a settlement
for a client. 25  She asserted that the attorney's fraud drastically
undermined the judicial process. 126  As in Wishart, she emphasized
protection of the process, the system, and the community. 27
116. Id. at 83-84.
117. 533 So. 2d 750 (Fla. 1988).
118. Id. at 758 (Barkett, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
119. Id. at 759 (quoting Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring)). Barkett does not specify whether seventeen-the age of the defendant in Le
Croy-should be the minimum age.
120. 543 So. 2d 1250 (Fla. 1989).
121. Id. at 1253.
122. Id. (Barkett, J., dissenting). According to Barkett, the attorney stated plainly that he
willfully disobeyed the court order because he believed the judge was wrong. Id.
Furthermore, he said that he would engage in this conduct again, on behalf of other clients as
well, if he felt it necessary. Id. Barkett stated: "No attorney is ever privileged to arrogate to
himself or herself the right to say with finality what the law is." Id.
123. Id.
124. 544 So. 2d 1003 (Fla. 1989).
125. Id. at 1004 (Barkett, J., dissenting).
126. Id.
127. In Florida Bar v. Patarini, 548 So. 2d 1110 (Fla. 1989), the majority ordered
suspension for an attorney who hired a muscle man to inflict physical harm on his ex-wife's
1178
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In contrast, In re Application of VMFfor Admission to Florida
Bar1 28 demonstrates Barkett's leniency in bar proceedings when the
context demands it. She concurred specially with the majority's opin-
ion allowing bar admission of an attorney who withheld information
on his bar application concerning an eleven-year-old drug incident.1
29
She noted that the applicant had relied on his father, an attorney, in
withholding the information.13 ° She also empathized with the fact
that the applicant was required to care for his father who was con-
fined to a wheelchair."' Unconcerned by these mitigating factors,
one of the dissenters would have required mandatory application of
the universal rule that willfully withholding pertinent information
calls for denial of bar admission. 13 2
E. Discrimination Law
The cornerstone of Barkett's approach in discrimination cases is
her support of full participation in society for all members, especially
the less powerful ones who typically have been excluded from com-
munity membership. 133 In seeking to empower disenfranchised indi-
viduals in society, she frequently disagrees with the majority of the
court. This subpart thus explores Barkett's opinions on gender dis-
counsel. Barkett dissented, recommending disbarment, because "the nature of this conduct, in
addition to its illegality, flagrantly undermines the entire judicial process." Id. at 1112
(Barkett, J., dissenting). The majority considered the attorney's emotional strain as a result of
his divorce as a mitigating circumstance. However, this' emotional strain was not enough to
prompt Barkett's compassion. Her concern for community trumped empathy for the attorney.
But see DeBock v. State, 512 So. 2d 164, 169 (Fla. 1987). Dissenting, Barkett stated: "To say
that bar disciplinary proceedings are remedial in order to protect the public and are not penal
in nature is pure semantic tomfoolery." Id.
128. 491 So. 2d 1104 (Fla. 1986).
129. Id. at 1107.
130. Id. at 1108 (Barkett, J., concurring specially).
131. Id.
132. Id. at 1108-09 (Ehrlich, J., dissenting). Ehrlich reasoned from an abstract principle
with no reference to context. On the other hand, Barkett's attention to context shows empathy
for the bar applicant's situation and his relationships.
133. One theme of feminist theory is the relationship of individuals to community. See
Schneider, supra note 18, at 603. "Feminist discourse and practice entails a struggle for
individual autonomy that is with others and for community that embraces diversity-that is,
for an integration of the individual and the collective in an ongoing process of authentic
individuation and genuine connectedness." Id. (quoting K. FERGUSON, THE FEMINIST CASE
AGAINST BUREAUCRACY 198 (1984)). See also Suzanna Sherry, Civic Virtue and the Feminine
Voice in Constitutional Adjudication, 72 VA. L. REV. 543, 592-613 (1986) (suggesting that
Justice O'Connor subscribes to communitarian theory). Liberal theory, in contrast to feminist
theory, insists on the primacy of individuals, rather than community, and views the individual
as the object of rights. See Charles Fried, The Supreme Court, 1989 Term: Metro
Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC-" Two Concepts of Equality, 104 HARV. L. REV. 107, 108 (1990)
(contrasting a communitarian and an individualistic view of rights).
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crimination, alienage discrimination, race discrimination, and voter
discrimination (or apportionment).
In Byrd v. Richardson-Greenshields Securities, Inc., Barkett
entertained sexual harassment claims brought by female employees
for assault and battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and
negligent hiring and retention of employees based on incidents of sex-
ual harassment. 135  Under existing law, the workers' compensation
statute provided the sole remedy for workers injured in the work-
place. 136 Barkett, nevertheless, allowed the women in Byrd to main-
tain a tort action against the employer. She surveyed other statutes,
finding a strong public policy against workplace sexual harassment.1 37
Noting that sexual harassment creates an offensive environment for
members of the workplace and an arbitrary barrier to sexual equal-
ity, 138 Barkett suggested that the women in Byrd had suffered injury
to a "personal right" 139 -the right to full membership in the work-
place without fear of degradation.
One of the concurring justices disagreed with Barkett's analysis,
finding the only issue to be whether the worker's compensation stat-
ute covered the injuries to these women. 14 If it did, the statute would
be the exclusive remedy, and the women could not recover because
the statute provided no damages for sexual harassment injuries. If the
workers' compensation statute did not cover the injuries to these
women, they could bring a private tort action for damages. The con-
curring justice found that because the language of the statute required
accidental injury in the workplace, and the actions in Byrd were not
accidental, the statute did not apply. 141
Barkett applied feminist jurisprudence in the alienage discrimina-
tion case of De Ayala v. Florida Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance
134. 552 So. 2d 1099 (Fla. 1989).
135. For an insightful analysis of sexual harassment in the workplace, see Amy Horton,
Comment, Of Supervision, Centerfolds, and Censorship: Sexual Harassment, the First
Amendment, and the Contours of Title VII, 46 U. MIAMI L. REV. 403 (1991).
136. The workers' compensation statute traditionally had not provided damages for injuries
caused by sexual harassment. Byrd, 552 So. 2d at 1102. If the women had been forced to quit
their jobs because of the sexual harassment, they might have sought damages for lost salary
under Title VII, Because these women were still working, Title VII would not have allowed
them to receive damages.
137. Id. at 1102-03.
138. Id. at 1103.
139. Id. at 1104.
140. Id. at 1106 (Ehrlich, J., concurring).
141. Justice Ehrlich reasoned that the acts being sued for simply did not fall within the
statute. No injury occurred "'by accident arising out of and in the course of employment,'
§ 440.02(14), Florida Statutes, for which worker's compensation benefits would be payable."
Id.
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Co. ,42 In De Ayala, the Florida Supreme Court struck down a statute
that limited death benefits for nonresident alien beneficiaries of
deceased workers, except Canadians, as a violation of equal protec-
tion.143 Writing for the majority, Barkett empathized with the plight
of nonresidents-Mexicans in this case-and refused to exclude them
from coverage. She could find no justification for "giving a benefit to
nonresident Canadians that is denied Mexicans."" De Ayala shows
Barkett's empathy for the less powerful people, those generally
excluded from the community. 145
In Kibler v. State,"' a case involving race discrimination, Barkett
joined a majority of the court in granting a white defendant standing
to object to the prosecutor's use of peremptory strikes to excuse black
jurors. The district court of appeal denied Kibler standing because he
was not of the same race as the jurors who were challenged. 147  In
addition to recognizing Kibler's standing, the Florida Supreme Court
found the prosecutor's explanation that he wanted to make room to
add other prospective jurors to the panel insufficient to rebut the
defendant's prima facie showing of discrimination. 141
Barkett concurred specially, adding that to hold otherwise would
mean that racial discrimination would be permitted in the use of per-
emptory challenges unless "by happenstance" the defendant and the
challenged juror were of the same racial minority. 149 Although she
expressed some concern with choosing between unfettered peremp-
tory challenges and anti-discrimination measures, she chose to pro-
hibit discrimination "regardless of the cost." 150 Thus, instead of
allowing complete autonomy to the individual, the prosecutor in this
142. 543 So. 2d 204 (Fla. 1989).
143. Id. at 207-08.
144. Id. at 207.
145. The dissent, in contrast, believed that equal protection should apply only to United
States citizens and residents. Id. at 208 (Overton, J., dissenting). Justice Overton's dissent is
another example of the abstract, universal rules that Barkett seeks to avoid. In an equal
protection case similar to De Ayala, Justice Barkett, again writing for the court, struck down
another statute with an alienage restriction as unconstitutional. See Palm Harbor Special Fire
Control Dist. v. Kelly, 516 So. 2d 249 (Fla. 1987). In Kelly, a non-citizen applied for a license
to act as a business agent for the Palm Harbor Fire Fighters Union. Id. at 250. Section
447.04, Florida Statutes (1985) provided that "[n]o person shall be granted a license or permit
to act as a business agent in the state ...who is not a citizen of the United States." Id.
Barkett asserted that "[t]he mere fact of alienage does not of itself render a person unfit to be a
business agent," and struck down section 447.04 as a denial of equal protection. Id. at 251,
253.
146. 546 So. 2d 710 (Fla. 1989).
147. Id. at 710-11.
148. Id. at 714.
149. Id. (Barkett, J., concurring specially).
150. Id.
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case, to exercise peremptory challenges, 51 Barkett opted for the deci-
sion that would indiscriminately include less powerful persons in the
legal process. She stated her belief that every juror has a right to
participate fully on a jury, an integral aspect of community member-
ship.'- 2 The defendant, too, would benefit from consideration of her
case by a true cross-section of the community. 53
Barkett dissented vigorously in an apportionment case concern-
ing Florida Bar voting when the majority allowed deviation from the
one person, one vote rule. In Florida Bar re Amendments to the Rules
Regulating the Florida Bar (Reapportionment),54 the Board of Bar
Governors' proposal to reapportion the board resulted in one repre-
sentative for the 117 members of the Third Circuit and six representa-
tives for the 8,225 members of the Eleventh Circuit. Barkett found no
useful purpose served by a provision that the membership of the
Third Circuit have more than ten times the representative power of
their counterparts in the Eleventh Circuit. 155 Barkett would likely
agree with the conclusion of one feminist scholar that apportionment
cases "involve one of the most fundamental aspects of community
membership, the right to participate in the shaping of the commu-
nity's values through the electoral process."' 56
IV. CONCLUSION.
Professor Katharine Bartlett observed the similarities and dis-
151. The dissent argued that despite its inherently discriminatory nature, the peremptory
challenge is essential in the trial lawyer's quest to obtain a fair and impartial jury. Id. (Ehrlich,
J., dissenting).
152. Id.
153. In another case involving the selection of jurors, Cook v. State, 542 So. 2d 964 (Fla.
1987). Barkett dissented from the majority's determination that a juror should not be
dismissed upon his subjective assertion that he did not understand English. Was Barkett
unconcerned about the inclusion of non-English speaking jurors, while eager to include racial
minorities? Or, rather, was she empathizing with the non-English speaking juror, and the
unfairness that would result for the defendant?
154. 518 So. 2d 251 (Fla. 1987).
155. Id. (Barkett, J., dissenting). Barkett declared that "the right to vote freely for the
candidate of one's choice is of the essence of a democratic society, and any restrictions on that
right strike at the heart of a democratic government." Id. (quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S.
533, 555 (1964)).
156. Sherry, supra note 133, at 596-97.
Age discrimination cases are a category of less controversial discrimination cases
addressed by the court. See Metropolitan Dade County Fair Housing and Employment
Appeals Bd. v. Sunrise Village Mobile Home Park, Inc., 511 So. 2d 962 (Fla. 1987) (Barkett
agreed with majority that refusing to allow a 29-year old to move into a "retirement
community" constituted age discrimination); Morrow v. Duval County School Bd., 514 So. 2d
1086 (Fla. 1987) (Barkett joined unanimous decision that school board had practiced arbitrary
age discrimination in refusing to rehire a seventy-year-old teacher).
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tinctions between feminist jurisprudence and traditional legal theory
as follows:
When feminists 'do law,' they do what other lawyers do: they
examine the facts of a legal issue or dispute, they identify the essen-
tial features of those facts, they determine what legal principles
should guide resolution of the dispute, and they apply those princi-
ples to the facts. This process unfolds not in a linear, sequential, or
strictly logical manner, but rather in a pragmatic, interactive
manner. 157
However, Bartlett adds, feminists go one step further-they seek "to
expose how the substance of law may silently and without justification
submerge the perspectives of women and other excluded groups." '58
Professor Barlett's description makes clear that feminist jurispru-
dence is not just a mechanism used to achieve desired results. Rather,
it involves a legitimate and practical reasoning process. Justice Bar-
kett engages in this reasoning process when she carefully examines the
facts of each case. In doing so, she exposes the bias in existing rules
and challenges the existing power structure.
Justice Barkett's methodology also defies the pervasive notion
that feminist jurisprudence is irrational, value-laden, and subversive
to the Rule of Law. Neither Justice Barkett nor feminist jurispru-
dence reject the Rule of Law; they simply place more emphasis on
personal experience, which is accessed through empathy. Instead of
using universal rules as a starting point for analysis, Justice Barkett
analyzes human experience to determine the applicability of rules.
Then, she uses human experience to determine the applicability of
rules. Then, it modifies those rules to take account of the relative
power of the people involved and their relationships to each other. As
illustrated with the sexual harassment claims in Byrd, this sometimes
requires supplementing the existing rule. At other times, as in
Wright, feminist jurisprudence requires recasting a rule, or as in Celo-
tex, redefining one of the terms of the rule so that a less powerful
person can gain its protection.
Feminist jurisprudence exposes the limits on the Rule of Law's
objectivity: the underlying terms of many rules are not predefined or
explicit. As Martha Minow stated, "court judgments endow some
perspectives, rather than others, with power. Judicial power is least
accountable when judges leave unstated-and treat as a given-the
157. Bartlett, supra note 16, at 836.
158. Id.
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perspective they select." 159 Thus, feminist jurisprudence, because it
exposes the basis of traditional rules is compatible with the judicial
role. 160
Feminist jurisprudence is not the first jurisprudential approach
to rethink legal rules.1 61  Not since the days of legal formalism has
anyone seriously suggested inflexible application of rules. Karl Llew-
ellyn (legal realism), Richard Posner (law and economics), and
Duncan Kennedy (critical legal studies) all have critiqued existing
jurisprudential methods. 162 Legal realism, in particular, and its attack
159. Martha Minow, The Supreme Court 1986 Term-Foreword: Justice Engendered, 101
HARV. L REV. 10, 94 (1987); see also Cain, supra note 3, at 1949-50.
If we are willing to admit that our judges naturally bring a point of view with
them into the courtroom, then what sort of language should we use to talk about
judicial bias? Are we prepared to discuss the good and bad biases of our judges?
If we are, does this entail the surrender of all objective notions of the Rule of
Law? How can we determine who is competent to judge?
One partial solution to these problems is to transform the practice of judging
so that the "power" to validate one perspective over another is never left in the
hands of one judge. Another approach to the problem would be to seek judges
with varied life experiences, judges with the potential for a better understanding
of the multitude of perspectives that are likely to be placed before them in the
courtroom.
160. See Resnick, supra note 97, at 1909-10 (arguing that adjudication and feminism are not
"fundamentally incompatible"). Resnik writes: Judges "change lives, transfer assets, imprison
individuals, and even determine life and death." Id. at 1885. Judging "is one instance of
governmental deployment of power that has the potential for genuine contextualism, for taking
seriously the needs of the individuals affected by decisions and shaping decisions accordingly."
Id. at 1909. Proper adjudication can be fluid and responsive. Id. "No judge stands outside a
social context." Id. at 1910.
Feminism may help us see that what the universal aspirations are attempting to
achieve may vary from context to context, from small community to large urban
setting, from trial court to appellate court, from single judge to collective judges,
from commercial to constitutional law. If we understand feminist skepticism not
as rejecting all levels of generality but rather as reminding us of the limits and
risks of such generalizing, we gain in our ability to press beyond the talisman-like
phrases.
Id. at 1911.
161. See Cass R. Sunstein, Feminism and Legal Theory, 101 HARV. L. REV. 826, 826
(1988) (reviewing CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED (1987)) ("[T]he
basic claims of feminist theory are in many circles denied credibility and respect, or even a fair
hearing."). Sunstein, a liberal legal scholar, suggests that the emergence of feminist legal
theory has "throw[n] into question practices and conceptual structures that had previously
been accepted or even invisible," and may produce "substantial changes in legal rules." Id.
Sunstein also notes that the feminist movement in law, like other intellectual and political
movements of the past, challenges "practices that had for a long period been taken as natural
and inviolate, sometimes even as based on biological differences" by revealing how these
practices are "socially created and subject to criticism and change." Id. Sunstein also suggests
that the feminist movement is the most powerful of the contemporary movements in legal
history. Id.
162. At least one legal scholar fears that these new jurisprudential movements mean "the
death of the law, as we have known it throughout history, and as we have come to admire it."
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on doctrinal abstractions, provides a historical parallel to feminist
jurisprudence. 163 The Realist's insistence on "situation sense" is simi-
lar to the power-empathy inquiry of feminist jurisprudence. Feminist
jurisprudence, however, as refracted through the lens of Justice Bar-
kett's opinions, reflects a special concern for human experience and
the position of the disadvantaged that goes beyond-although it does
build upon-the insights of legal realism.
Traditional legal theory seeks to construct and apply abstract
rules. 1 ' A contract, for instance, requires consideration, and a gift
requires delivery. A statute of limitations bars all actions not brought
before it expires. Traditional legal thought teaches that a rule is good
if it is detached and transcends the results of particular cases. 165 The
problem with abstraction is that it overlooks context.1 66 Only by
looking at context, as Justice Barkett does, can a judge empathize
with the actual human situations that gave rise to a dispute, situations
to which a jurisprudential theory must respond.1 67 Rules without
relation to context overlook these human experiences that should
See Fiss, supra note 38, at 1 (contending that law and economics and critical legal studies are
unhealthy in that they "distort the purposes of law and threaten its very existence").
163. Feminist scholars have acknowledged the contribution of legal realism to feminist
jurisprudence. See, e.g., Scales, supra note 6, at 1400. Legal realists like Felix Cohen contend
that legal scholars should be skeptical about claims of legal objectivity; Felix Cohen,
Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809, 821 (1935).
Karl Llewellyn attempted to establish a new "Realistic Jurisprudence" that would require
judges to look beyond abstract legal verbalism and focus instead on behavioral factors, "such
as the area of contact and interaction." See Karl N. Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence-
The Next Step, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 431 (1930). One should approach the law, "not with the
idea of formulating its rules into a system, but with an eye to discovering how much it does or
can effect .. " Id.; see also Minda, supra note 37, at 635.
164. See Bartlett, supra note 16, at 832 ("Traditional legal methods place a high premium
on the predictability, certainty, and fixity of rules. In contrast, feminist legal methods, which
have emerged from the critique that existing rules overrepresent existing power structures,
value rule-flexibility and the ability to identify missing points of view."). See also Mari J.
Matsuda, Liberal Jurisprudence and Abstracted Visions of Human Nature: A Feminist Critique
of Rawls' Theory of Justice, 16 N.M.L. REV. 613 (1986) (inviting feminist critique of
mainstream jurisprudence because of its refusal to acknowledge context).
165. Scales, supra note 6, at 1377.
166. One feminist notes that abstract universality provides "no bridge to the concrete." See
id. (quoting Carol C. Gould, The Woman Question: Philosophy of Liberation and the
Liberation of Philosophy, in WOMEN AND PHILOSOPHY: TOWARD A THEORY OF LIBERATION
5-6 (Carol C. Gould & Marx W. Wartofsky eds. 1976).
When Justice Barkett was sworn in to the Supreme Court of Florida, she declared: "The
law is not an abstract set of rules and procedures established for its own sake but a living
protector of the right of every citizen to be treated fairly and equally in every context."
Michael Moline, Barkett Takes Oath as Florida's First Woman Supreme Court Justice, UPI,
Nov. 15, 1985.
167. See Scales, supra note 6, at 1380; see also Bartlett, supra note 16, at 850-63. What
Bartlett calls "feminist practical reasoning" focuses on the real rather than the abstract,
"approach[ing] problems not as dichotimized conflicts, but as dilemmas... [which] do not call
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form the basis for judicial decisionmaking. 168 In sum, Justice Bar-
kett's feminist jurisprudence provides an exemplary model for judicial
decisionmaking.
LANAE HOLBROOK
for the choice of one principle over another," but for attention to context. Id. at 851. Each
case presents a unique situation and cannot be generalized in advance. Id.
168. Minow, supra note 159, at 16. Minow urges the judiciary to "approach questions of
difference by seeking out unstated assumptions about difference and typically unheard points
of view." Id. She states that "[t]here will not be a rule, a concept, a norm, or a test to apply"
to certain problems. Id. The judiciary should avoid categorical solutions, because they cut off
understanding. Id. Minow defends her approach:
Far from being unmanageable, this approach describes what happens already in
the best practices of justice. Justice, in this view, is not abstract, universal, or
neutral. Instead, justice is the quality of human engagement with multiple
perspectives framed by, but not limited to, the relationships of power in which
they are formed.
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